AimsSport specialization is an actual trend in youth athletes, but it can increase injury risk. The aim was to determine the eventual correlation between sports specialization and injury risk in various sports, using a biopsychosocial approach.Methods169 sport-specialized athletes completed [; overall,, ] a self-reported questionnaire regarding sociodemographic, physical-attitudinal, injuries and psychological-attitudinal To analyze data univariate and correlate analyses were used.ResultsOf 169 athletes enrolled, 53% were single-sport specialized. In team sports a high risk of having to remain at rest for up (...) to 1 month because of overuse was observed. Males who suffered direct trauma in the team group were more exposed to that type of injury, and also the type of specialization figured significantly. In addition, interoceptive awareness correlates with injury. This study shows that, even though young athletes seem to be at a high risk of becoming injured, early team sport specialization and a high performance level cannot be considered to be the only risk factors. (shrink)

Este escrito presenta el tema del cuerpo y de la corporeidad en la Scienza nuova de Vico, confrontando las dos interpretaciones, que la autora opone, de Alberto M. Damiani y de Giuseppe Patella.Palabras clave: Vico, cuerpo, corporeidad, A. Damiani, G. Patella.This paper focusses on the subject of body and embodiment in Vico’s Scienza nuova, by confronting the interpretations of Alberto M. Damiani and Giuseppe Patella.Keywords: Vico, body, embodiment, A. Damiani, G. Patella.

En el actual contexto de un nihilismo que suele afirmarse como horizonte insuperable de nuestro tiempo, urge mostrar que no es así. Nada mejor que mirar la experiencia de hombres que han sabido recorrer hasta el fondo el camino del nihilismo y redescubrir su humanidad. Giuseppe Capograssi es uno de ellos. La vida y obra de este genial filósofo del Derecho del siglo XX están traspasadas por la conciencia de que la dependencia, la tristeza y la melancolía son la (...) misma estructura del yo, el terreno abonado en el que, gracias a un encuentro, puede florecer la esperanza. (shrink)

After the Maastricht and Amsterdam Conferences the European Union can no longer be conceived as an intergovernmental arrangement: It is a polity founded on an “overlapping consensus.” Consequently, to reconstruct the relations between national and Community law, legal monism does not work, neither in its statist, nor in its international version: Legal pluralism is needed, not in a sociological‐descriptive sense, but as a normative criterion by which a judge (and a citizen) must refer to many and various sources of law (...) to settle a dispute. Legal pluralism, however, can operate only under a rule of recognition: a common normative framework within which a reasonable number of sources can be handled. What Europe needs, therefore, is an interactionist constitution, which should emerge through an “open‐ended”discursive process. (shrink)

This article provides an assessment of the merits of recent theories of legal reasoning. After a quick historical aperçu a number of models of legal argumentation are presented and discussed, with an eye to their mutual connection. An initial conclusion is that universalizability and discursivity are the common features of those models. The focal question dealt with, however, is that of the impact of the argumentative paradigms of adjudication on the very concept of law. Here the contention is that an (...) argumentative style of reasoning contributes to rendering the structure of the law itself and its operations argumentative as well. By so doing the latter are—so to say—civilized and made less truculent. They will thus be able to develop more in conformity with a democratic form of life. (shrink)

La caída del Muro de Berlín fue saludado por muchos analistas y académicos como el inicio de una nueva era. Con el fin de la Guerra Fría se vislumbraba una nueva etapa de paz y prosperidad. Tras la “revolución liberal” algunos avistaban el “fin de la historia”. Pero tal esperanza se disipó rápidamente: la desaparición del “socialismo real” relanzó un capitalismo desenfrenado y no sólo en los países ayer bajo la órbita soviética. El ordoliberalismo entendido como el establecimiento de un (...) modelo económico altamente competitivo y garantizado jurisdiccionalmente, se infiltró también en las instituciones europeas. La crisis del año 2010 vino a confirmar para Europa su deriva neoliberal, tecnocrática. La onda expansiva del 9 de noviembre de 1989 aún no ha concluido. Nuevas turbulencias aguardan. El Brexit también puede interpretarse en esta clave, como una empresa más de demolición, “liquidación”, “liberalización”. (shrink)

Law seems to be irremediadibly connected to the experience of coercion and to a structure of hierarchy. This is so because it has traditionally been defined as a set of authoritative prescriptions, usually commands backed by the menace of a sanction, an evil eventually applied through the use of overwhelming violence. Law has also been related to some kind of structure or system which is intrinsically hierarchical, both in the sense of the hierarchy of people whose conduct is addressed by (...) the law and in the sense of the logical interdependence of the legal prescriptions themselves. The British legal philosopher H. L. A. Hart criticizes in his celabrated book The Concept of Law powerfully the command theory and also reshapes the theory of the hierarchical structure of rules. The paper will tries to follow Hart’s attack to the traditional imperativistic view and will then focus on his treatment of international law. The aim is to show on the one side how promising Hart’s approach could be, and on the other side how poor however his conceptualization of international law at the end of the day reveals to be. (shrink)

Le droit est traditionnellement lié à la pratique du commandement et de la hiérarchie. Il semble qu’une règle juridique établisse une immédiate relation entre une norme supérieure et une norme inférieure. La conception hiérarchique et impérative peut néanmoins être remise en cause dès lors que la phénoménologie de la règle juridique est appréhendée d’un point de vue interne, celui de ceux que l’on peut considérer comme les « utilisateurs » de la règle plutôt que ceux qui la subissent. Une approche (...) tournée vers la pratique pourrait, de cette façon, conduire à une théorie du droit plus ouverte et, d’une certaine façon, moins idéologique ou sectaire. C’est – comme le défend cet article – le programme ou mieux la promesse que l’on trouve dans l’ouvrage principal de Hart, le Concept de droit. Cet article tente de rendre cette promesse plus transparente sans toutefois dissimuler les difficultés de sa stratégie narrative et argumentative. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: After World War Two a gigantic effort was made in order to build a viable and stable international order, beginning with the Bretton Woods agreement that was aimed to stabilize the international monetary system, and with the United Nations, that were intended to restore legality in interstate affairs and somehow initiate a cosmopolitan conversation among Nation States. This order is now slowly crumbling down, paradoxically through globalization, and a triumphant neoliberalism. A new, but indeed quite old narrative, rather a (...) myth, of what a national identity means is again getting the upper hand.KEYWORDS: international relations, international law, European Union, globalization, national identity. (shrink)

This is an attempt to conceptualize freedom beyond the now traditional opposition beetween a negative and a positive notion. To this purpose several weaknesses of the idea of negative freedom are pointed out and taken into account, while positive freedom is reinterpreted in terms of a social capacity, without reference however to romantic self-affirmation. Freeedom is thus seen connected with the question of power and authority, whose main theories are then shortly assessed. Among these the so-called „service conception“ is the (...) object of a more detailed discussion. The outcome will be a proposal to make it possible to understand freedom as a special enabling position with regard to authority. (shrink)

A permanent approach to what law is has been that of interpreting it in terms of repression or reduction of chances or courses of conduct. This approach, however, is not able to render justice to fundamental moments of the legal practice, beginning with constitutional law and its empowering rules. Nonetheless, the mainstream in the philosophy of law and in the legal theory has not at all been worried about this strange inadequacy of imperativism to offer a complete view of legal (...) practice and legal institutions. Force, violence, sanction, prescription still are the basic conceptual knots used to weave the cloth of law and lawyers. Hannah Arendt perceptive though scanty remarks on law, within her wider reflections on action and judgment, offer a different view and open a new path for a jurisprudence less obsessed with coercion, and against the tradition supporting the centrality of command in the tlegal domain. Such view and that path this paper tries sympathetically to explore. (shrink)

My paper consists of four sections. The first is concerned with the distinction and connection between fundamental and human rights. Here I shall just introduce a few conceptual notions and definitions that are more or less widely used, but that may help us to frame the issue and better focus on the most relevant question of the foundation or justification of human rights. In the second and third sections I will present what I believe to be the four fundamental normative (...) situations that shape our understanding and use of human rights. In the second section attention will focus on what in my opinion is the most basic of these four normative situations, which I call the “existential” situation. This is intended to offer a strong foundation for human rights as “not metaphysical,” without appealing to or relying on heavy metaphysical assumptions. I will try to stick more or less to an argumentative strategy based on common sense. The third section, dealing with the three other normative situations, will to some extent be an exercise in eclecticism, trying to combine different approaches to (and schools of thought on) the question of normativity. Here eclecticism will not be trivial, or at least I hope not. In the fourth and final section I will briefly conclude with a general overview on the issue of the “existence” of normativity and human rights. (shrink)

Volume 11, Issue 1, March 2020, Page 92-100.

There are few problems to which legal philosophers have devoted more attention than the relationship between morality and law, or, said in different terms, between the “good” and the “obligatory”. One might think that all that should and could be said about it has already been uttered or written. Nevertheless philosophy — and legal philosophy is no exception — is just this: rethinking old problems which are in fact always new,1 and for which no definitive solution is given — nor (...) is possible, I would add — and which need a permanent effort of reassessment. There is no reason for disappointment or despair in this endless work. It is neither pointless nor irrelevant. (shrink)